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Introduction
Authoritarianism is on the rise in China. So is the struggle for politicalchange. As Xi Jinping consolidates his power and control over Chi-nese politics and society following his ascendance to leadership in
2012, law and lawyers have risen to the spotlight. On the one hand, the
Fourth Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Congress of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party (CCP) in 2014 laid out a comprehensive blueprint for China’s legal
reform, characterised by more hierarchical control over the courts, more
transparency of judicial decisions, as well as higher educational standards
for entry into the legal profession and other legal careers. In March 2018,
the CCP announced that it would establish a “Committee on Comprehensive
Law-Based Governance” (Zhongyang quanmian yifa zhiguo weiyuanhui
中央全面依法治国委员会). On the other hand, the establishment of the
National Supervision Commission has legalised the CCP’s disciplinary sys-
tem on its members and has created an alternative process for criminal
sanctions (Li 2016), while the large-scale “709 Crackdown” on activist
lawyers since July 2015 has sent a lasting chill over the entire Chinese legal
profession (Liu and Halliday 2016; Fu 2018).
With these parallel and contorted developments, the meaning of rule of
law in the Chinese context appears vague and elusive, despite the scholarly
effort to situate it within China’s political regime (Wang 2014; Li 2015;
Trevaskes 2017). In this article, we approach the difficult topic of China and
the rule of law from a unique perspective, that is, by examining how polit-
ically liberal lawyers in Beijing and Hong Kong make sense of the rule of
law as it relates to authoritarianism and political liberalism. We find that
rule of law is evoked as a discursive instrument to legitimise lawyers’ fight
against the authoritarian state. Law is a weapon with symbolic power, but
alone it is insufficiently transformative in authoritarian contexts. In Beijing,
it is used as a sword to advance lawyers’ liberal pursuit; yet in Hong Kong,
it is used as a shield to defend lawyers’ commitment to judicial autonomy
(Mosher and Poon 2009). Only by situating the rule-of-law discourses in
lawyers’ local fights against authoritarianism can we fully understand its
meanings and implications in the context of China’s legal and political
change. 
Our empirical data come from two separate yet complementary sources.
First, from 2010 to 2015, Halliday and Liu repeatedly interviewed a group
of activist lawyers in Beijing and discussed with them various aspects of
the rule of law and political liberalism in detail. (1) With the assistance of an
activist lawyer who served as his interpreter, Halliday also participated in
some of their meetings and social activities as an unobtrusive observer.
Many of our interviewees were persecuted during the 709 Crackdown, in
which more than 200 lawyers were taken in for questioning or detained,
and some suffered torture and imprisonment (Fu 2018). This development
made our interview data an invaluable source for understanding the political
values and ideology of Chinese lawyers in the prime of their careers as po-
litical activists. 
Second, from 2016 to 2018, Hsu conducted interviews and participant
observation with pro-democracy lawyers (2) in Hong Kong, including both
barristers and solicitors. In 2016 and 2017, she approached her interviewees
through a network of pro-democracy lawyers who aligned during the Um-
brella Movement in 2014. The network, consisting of barristers, solicitors,
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1. In the following text, interviews are coded in the format of “B1501,” in which “B” refers to Beijing,
and “15” refers to the year of the interview, while “01” refers to the number of the interview con-
ducted in the year.
2. In this article, we identify the interviewees as “pro-democracy lawyers” but recognise the fact
that they sometimes may identify themselves as “pan-democracy lawyers.” In the mid-2000s, a
number of political organisations emerged in Hong Kong, taking up different stances and proposing
strategies to advance and consolidate democratic practices in the region. This created a spectrum
of a pan-democracy camp, as opposed to the traditional group of pro-democracy advocates that
first became active in the 1980s. For the purposes of analytical clarity and comparison with ac-
tivist lawyers in Beijing, we adopt the term “pro-democracy” to refer to the Hong Kong lawyers
discussed in the article. But note that these lawyers may not belong to the specific camp in the
local context. We also emphasise that democracy and political liberalism cannot be conflated
theoretically, although in the case of Hong Kong, pro-democracy lawyers are likely to be politically
liberal as most of them support basic legal freedoms, civil society, and the moderate state (Hal-
liday and Karpik 1997; Tam 2013; Lee 2017a, 2017b). 
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law students, and some legally trained civil servants, has been active in local
politics. They not only publish commentaries on public policies and legal-
political issues but also organise formal and informal meetings to mobilise.
While the network has a strictly anonymous policy to protect its members’
identities, Hsu was invited to some private events and befriended several
core members. In 2018, Hsu extended the scope of interviews to a wider
range of Hong Kong lawyers, including solicitors in local and international
law firms, and barristers who represent both individual and corporate
clients. (3) Hsu’s interviews focused on lawyers’ ideas of judicial autonomy
in Hong Kong. For those politically active lawyers, the focus of inquiry was
on their perceptions of, and thereafter resistance to, interventions from Bei-
jing as the “one country, two systems” principle weakens in practice. For
the less politically active lawyers, the focus of inquiry was on their views of
and responses to the public discourse on rule of law. Reflections from rou-
tine practitioners in Hong Kong help us situate the pro-democracy lawyers
in the broader legal community and identify the instrumentality of rule-of-
law discourse in the local context, in which an established common law
system faces increasing pressure from an authoritarian regime. 
Combining those two data sources therefore enables us to sketch an in-
tricate mosaic of the ways that lawyers inside and outside of Communist
rule interpret and make use of ideas of rule of law. Although the case of
Hong Kong may seem distant from the case of Beijing at first glance,
lawyers’ encounters with the authoritarian legality of the Chinese state
(Gallagher 2017) in the two cases make an empirically fascinating and the-
oretically meaningful contrast, as our data analysis in the following pages
demonstrates. While rule-of-law discourse permeates the daily language of
the Hong Kong legal profession, in order to legitimise their political stance,
pro-democracy lawyers usually calibrate the rhetorical focus with respect
to different political events. Similarly, activist lawyers in Beijing choose their
cases and public voices carefully in order to gain legitimacy both domesti-
cally and internationally. The universal, anti-authoritarian orientation of
rule-of-law discourse offers them a critical source of legitimation, as it does
for pro-democracy lawyers in Hong Kong. In other words, the common op-
ponent of the Chinese state and the authoritarian legality that it promotes
in both mainland China and Hong Kong makes rule of law an indispensable
ideology and a useful rhetoric for politically liberal lawyers in both cases.
By documenting and analysing their rule-of-law discourses, we hope to pre-
sent a window through which scholarly discussions on China and the rule
of law can be grounded empirically in the actions and words of lawyers. 
Given the high political sensitivity of our fieldwork in both sites, especially
Beijing, we have not only omitted all the names and identifying information
of our interviewees in the following text as required by research ethics, but
have also adopted an analytical rather than narrative way of story-telling
to further protect their identities. We also refrain from discussing our field-
work strategies in detail in order to avoid exposing them to the potential
surveillance of the Chinese state, which could make such risky empirical re-
search impossible in the future. Nevertheless, in the following pages we
make extensive use of direct quotes from our interviews to give the readers
a good sense of lawyers’ original discourses in both cases. 
China and the rule of law: Seeing like
lawyers
The rule of law is arguably one of the most enigmatic concepts in the social
sciences. After decades of theoretical debate and empirical investigation, its
meaning remains controversial and its analytical usage incoherent (Hart
1958; Fuller 1964; Dworkin 1985; Allan 2001; Tamanaha 2004; Ohnesorge
2007; Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008; Rajah 2012; Hadfield and Weingast
2014; Cheesman 2015; Krygier 2016; Massoud 2016; Versteeg and Ginsburg
2016). However different, in most of its scholarly versions the rule of law
demands that “people in positions of authority should exercise their power
within a constraining framework,” rather than in “an arbitrary, ad hoc, or
purely discretionary manner on the basis of their own preferences or ideol-
ogy” (Waldron 2016). Hence, empirical research on the rule of law aims to
capture “the relationship between law and the exercise of power” and to ob-
serve the functions of law in “articulating, channeling, constraining and in-
forming, rather than merely serving, such power exercise” (Krygier 2012: 46). 
Subjecting the relationship between law and power to empirical rule-of-
law research, as we do in this article, is to capture a set of two-way inter-
actions between political liberalism and authoritarianism. That is, we study
politically liberal lawyers in China as agents in a difficult fight against arbi-
trary power, in which law is not only instrumental to their liberal pursuit
but also serves as an effective tool for the authoritarian state to temper
such effort. Informed by prior socio-legal studies on political liberalism, a
concept developed for studying lawyers’ political mobilisation across the
world, we take its three main components into consideration: basic legal
freedoms, civil society, and the moderate state (Halliday and Karpik 1997;
Halliday, Karpik, and Feeley 2007; Halliday, Karpik, and Feeley 2012). In ad-
dition to the rule-of-law doctrine, which encompasses many elements of
basic legal freedoms (e.g., legal proceduralism, due process, core civil rights,
property rights, etc.) and the moderate state ( judicial independence, frac-
turing of state power, etc.), the concept of political liberalism incorporates
elements of civil society (professional associations, the public sphere, etc.)
to capture the social forces that constrain the arbitrary exercise of power,
which, in turn, speaks directly to the core of the rule-of-law debate. 
The parallel lines of theoretical discussions on the rule of law, authoritar-
ianism, and political liberalism can be integrated into three aspects of our
empirical analysis: first, the procedural aspect of rule of law, which empha-
sises the modes of governance and often denotes that the government shall
impose no penalty, stigma, or loss unless proper procedures are upheld
(Tashima 2008); second, the substantive aspect of rule of law, which links
formal features with individual liberty (Hayek 1960), equality (Allan 2001),
and justice (Hart 2012), particularly manifested in the protection of fun-
damental human rights (Agrast, Botero, and Ponce 2011: 9) and property
rights (Cass 2001); third, we examine lawyers’ endeavours to strengthen
civil society in order to fight against the authoritarian state. More specifi-
cally, we look into the bar (Halliday 1987), the legal complex, including (but
not limited to) judges and lawyers (Karpik and Halliday 2011), and the con-
nections between lawyers and other civil society groups. 
This analytical framework allows us to reduce the ambiguity of rule of
law as a concept, yet situates it in the local contexts of mainland China and
Hong Kong. In the Chinese written language, there are two parallel concepts
with the same pronunciation, fazhi, but one concept (法制) has a “knife”
symbol in its character and the other (法治) has a “water” symbol. The sec-
ond concept is often translated as “rule of law” and the first as “rule by law”
in scholarly writings, but the official term frequently used by the CCP is
“governing the nation in accordance with the law” or “law-based gover-
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3. The interviews in Hong Kong are coded in a similar format of “HKS1701” or “HKB1701,” in which
“HK” refers to Hong Kong, “17” indicates the year of the interview, “S” refers to solicitors while
“B” refers to barristers, and “01” is the number of the interview conducted in that year.
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nance” (yifa zhiguo 依法治国). This peculiar term seems to conflate the Ger-
man concept Rechtsstaat and the Anglo-American concept “rule of law,” as
the Chinese translation of Rechtsstaat would be “law-ruled state” (fazhi guo
法治国), almost identical to the CCP rhetoric of law-based governance. Con-
flating similar concepts is a common rhetorical strategy to disguise arbitrary
power (Krygier 2006, 2012), as different generations of CCP officials con-
tinue to coin pseudo-legal terms denoting political goals. In the Jiang Zemin
era, “law-based governance” was proposed as complementary to “moral-
ity-based governance” (yide zhiguo 以德治国), and then subsequently re-
garded as one of the three governing principles together with party
leadership and the people’s will in the Hu Jintao era (Li 2015; Wang and Liu
2019). Recently under Xi Jinping’s leadership, “law-ruled China” (fazhi
Zhongguo 法治中国) is one of the newly proposed terms. Meanwhile, the
CCP’s dominance over politics and society is made more explicit, which
puts law-based governance in a subordinate position in the Chinese political
and legal systems (Li 2015; Trevaskes 2017).
The subordination of law to power makes the practice of lawyers in China,
especially political activists, full of tensions and pitfalls (Fu and Cullen 2008,
2011; Pils 2015; Liu and Halliday 2016; Stern 2017; Fu 2018). In our in-depth
interviews with politically liberal lawyers in Beijing and Hong Kong, both
legal proceduralism and substantive rights are frequently discussed but the
primary target behind rule-of-law discourses is authoritarianism, as the
Party-state sugar-coats unchecked political dominance with a legal façade.
Similar to Cheesman’s (2015) contrast between “law and order” and the
rule of law in Myanmar, only by contrasting the rule of law with China’s
“authoritarian legality” (Gallagher 2017) can we grasp its localised mean-
ings, manifested in the everyday struggles of politically liberal lawyers (Liu
and Halliday 2011). 
The juxtaposition of Hong Kong and Beijing lawyers sharpens this contrast
between the rule of law and authoritarianism. In mainland China, the public
sphere is a contentious yet highly constrained space (Lei 2018), and bar as-
sociations are under the direct control of the administrative state (McMor-
row, Liu, and van Rooij 2017). By contrast, in Hong Kong there is a vibrant
bar and a mature civil society, long existing but increasingly pressed by Bei-
jing (Tam 2013; Jones 2015; Lee 2017a, 2017b). The Hong Kong judiciary
also enjoys a high degree of judicial autonomy, whereas Chinese courts are
deeply embedded in local governments and the Party’s political-legal com-
mittees (Ng and He 2017). Do the variations on judicial autonomy and civil
society between Beijing and Hong Kong lead to different conceptions of
rule of law for lawyers in the two jurisdictions? Or do their ideas of rule of
law converge because of the common threat from the authoritarian state? 
As our empirical analysis in the following pages suggests, while lawyers
in both cases strongly emphasise the procedural aspect of rule of law, es-
pecially legal proceduralism and the institutions of judicial independence,
activist lawyers in Beijing demonstrate notably more attention to substan-
tive rights and closer affinity with civil society than pro-democracy lawyers
in Hong Kong, whose insistence on defending the judiciary sometimes puts
them at odds with other activists in civil society. Nevertheless, the idiom
of rule of law provides a useful symbolic weapon for both groups to fight
against authoritarianism. In the case of Beijing, it is a blunt sword for activist
lawyers to arm themselves against the abuse of state power when they
have little else to reply upon, as well as an ideal for an alternative legal-po-
litical order. In the case of Hong Kong, it is a solid shield for pro-democracy
lawyers to guard against Beijing’s political influence and to maintain an in-
stitutionalised legal order. 
Rule of law as a blunt sword: Activist
lawyers in Beijing
Activist lawyers in Beijing often live marginalised and fraught lives. Con-
stantly under the threat of state repression, they nevertheless take on some
of the most sensitive and risky cases across China. Not surprisingly, they
have experienced serious violations of both the procedural and substantive
rights of their clients and themselves. This is especially the case for lawyers
focusing on human rights cases, but it is also common for other criminal
defence lawyers and public interest lawyers who frequently challenge the
authoritarian state in their work. In our extended interviews, elements of
the rule-of-law ideal are frequently evoked to justify their actions and chal-
lenge the state repression that they face in everyday practice. To some ex-
tent, rule of law becomes a “weapon of the weak” (Scott 1985) for these
marginalised yet courageous lawyers. 
One of the most commonly observed rule-of-law discourses is about the
lack of judicial independence in China. A leading human rights lawyer called
Chinese judges both “dictators” in court and “puppets controlled by other
powers” (B1401). The local authorities can influence judicial decisions, es-
pecially in politically sensitive cases, through the CCP’s political-legal com-
mittee (PLC), a Party organ sitting above the police, the procuracy, and the
court in China’s political-legal system (Wang and Liu 2019). As another
lawyer commented, “[t]he Party controls everything, leads everything, and
there are lots of subdivisions in the Party, and the PLC is the subdivision
controlling the judicial system” (B1319). Under this structure, “the PLC is
the leader, the quintessential part” (B1112), and “the police chief has a
higher title in the Party than the court president or the chief procurator”
(B1313). Consequently, in criminal cases, the police and the PLC “are the
faucet that can cut off the case before it gets to court” (B1112). When cases
do get to court, “as long as there is a prosecution, there must be a sentence;
and as long as there is an appeal, it must be declined” (B1005) in order to
maintain the authority of the police and the procuracy. 
The deficiency in judicial independence makes empty promises of many
basic procedural rights of lawyers and citizens in the legal process, especially
in politically sensitive cases. For example, an activist lawyer described his
experience with the police and the court when representing Falun Gong
practitioners as follows: 
When we got there the police said we could not meet with the sus-
pect. They were told by the leaders that no Falun Gong cases could
have legal representation. (…) We told the police about the Criminal
Procedure Law, the Lawyers Law, and the right to meet with the sus-
pect. The police officer said, “There are so many laws [but] we only lis-
ten to our leaders. Don’t talk to us about the law.” So we went back in
May, and this time the judge showed us a piece of paper and on it
there were signatures of the criminal suspects and on the paper it said,
“[d]ear leaders, we do not need lawyers to represent us in this case.”
They were real signatures, but we don’t know how they got them to
sign. (…) The third time we went there was a Sunday. They held the
trial at the detention centre. When we were trying to get there the
road was blocked one kilometre from the detention centre. (…) Until
the trial was over we couldn’t meet our client in person. (B1131)
What is remarkable about this and many other similar encounters be-
tween activist lawyers and the police or the court is not only how much
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difficulty the lawyers faced, but also how persistently they stuck to proce-
dural rules in fighting for their clients’ legal rights. A group of activist lawyers
even labelled themselves “die-hard lawyers” (sike lüshi 死磕律师), which
implies exhausting all legal means to fight against procedural violations in
court and in the public domain. Participants of the die-hard lawyering
movement in 2011-2015 included not only notable human rights activists,
but also many progressive elites and grassroots activists who usually do not
handle sensitive human rights cases but nevertheless care deeply about
legal proceduralism and the abuse of state power (Liu and Halliday 2016).
As an active participant of the movement explained: 
We don’t have rule of law currently. In such a context die-hard
lawyers appear. Although we don’t have rule of law, we have law. But
the court does not implement the law. It seriously violates the rights
of the defendant. More importantly it produces unjust verdicts. [Die-
hard] lawyers don’t want to be window-dressing. We want to make
a difference. (B1416) 
Die-hard lawyering is both an attitude and a practice. As an attitude, it
draws heavily on the instrumentality of law and attacks all forms of power
abuse in the legal process as far as possible with the rule of law as a weapon.
As a practice, it combines courtroom drama with a “surrounding gaze”
(weiguan 围观) on social media, particularly Weibo (the Chinese equivalent
of Twitter), to maximise the impact of collective action (Teng 2012). Be-
neath the strong performativity of their action is a firm belief in the signif-
icance of legal proceduralism for the practice of lawyers and the proper
administration of justice. As one notable activist lawyer commented:
Chinese judges are used to not complying strictly with procedural
rules, so it is easy to find loopholes in proceedings. (…) So we will
fight for this right to do the whole process again. (B1514)
In the Chinese context, as in many other places, the pursuit of legal pro-
ceduralism is deeply entangled with striving for substantive rights and jus-
tice (Pereira 2005; Dyzenhaus 2010). To some extent, die-hard lawyers
choose to fight hard for proceduralism precisely because their fight for sub-
stantive rights in the judicial process is a steep uphill battle. For cases in-
volving human rights issues, lawyers often take on a case knowing that it is
destined to be a lost battle. Nonetheless, when asked which legal rights are
the most fundamental to the rule of law, in addition to due process protec-
tions most activist lawyers state unequivocally their advocacy of basic legal
freedoms such as freedom of speech, freedom of association, and religious
freedom. 
Freedom of speech, as one lawyer put it, “is the basis for supervision and
checks and balances of power” (B1131). For another lawyer, “only freedom
of speech will reveal the truth to the public” (B1112). Christian lawyers,
who accounted for a significant proportion of China’s human rights lawyers,
often linked freedom of speech to religious freedom. One lawyer regarded
religious freedom as the most fundamental one because it is “the basic stan-
dard for a free human being to think and believe and to live autonomously
and independently” (B1123). Another Christian lawyer argued that freedom
of association and freedom of speech are derived from religious freedom,
which is concerned with the “freedoms of your soul, your mind, your heart”
(B1108). For this lawyer, defending religious freedom is not limited to help-
ing other Christians:
As a Christian I defend other religious believers. So, just as I am a
Han, I defend Tibetans. I want to show the world that doing justice
means not [only] doing justice with your own group. (B1108)
In addition to its emphasis on basic legal freedoms, the rule of law is often
associated with the security of property rights under legal rules. This asso-
ciation manifests frequently and explicitly in our conversations with activist
lawyers in Beijing. As China urbanised rapidly in the early twenty-first cen-
tury, rural land-taking and urban evictions became prominent social prob-
lems and sometimes led to major social unrest (Cai 2010; Ong 2014;
O’Brien and Deng 2015). Not surprisingly, activist lawyers were often at the
frontline in such cases, which made them fully appreciate the importance
of property rights. While many lawyers acknowledged the improvement of
China’s property law on the books (B1126, B1132), they also lamented the
law’s poor implementation. As a lawyer who had years of experience with
land-taking and eviction cases explained: 
Although the law has changed, local governments just ignore it. They
act like robbers. Sometimes the local governments hire mafia to fight
with people and move them out. Since the law is not effective,
lawyers are not effective, and we have no choice but to let the farm-
ers fight their own battles against the government. (B1403)
Despite the great difficulty of protecting citizens’ property rights in prac-
tice, some activist lawyers regarded it as closely related to “the dignity of
human beings” (B1126, B1523). Furthermore, one lawyer even argued that
protecting property rights would “change the relationship between citizens
and the government” and “help with the development of democracy in
China” (B1123). Although this argument remains a distant hope in the Chi-
nese context, it shows how activist lawyers construct their system of beliefs
by connecting different elements of the rule of law. 
Yet there are two other interrelated discourses in our interviews with ac-
tivist lawyers in Beijing that neither the procedural aspect nor the substan-
tive aspect of rule of law captures directly: (1) the discourse of their fight
against the authoritarian state; and (2) the discourse of the growth of civil
society. Despite the shrinking space for civil society in China since Xi Jin-
ping’s ascendance to power (Fu and Distelhorst 2018), many activist lawyers
considered their work closely associated with building a viable civil society,
sometimes by “waking up rights consciousness of Chinese citizens” (B1113).
The capacity of citizens to mobilise and engage in rights activism was often
linked to the prospect of rule of law in China. As the following two lawyers
commented: 
There are two aspects [of rule of law]. First, the public must believe
in and respect laws. Second, we have a very effective system of su-
pervision that could enforce laws. (…) We also hear that there is no
rule of law in China. (…) In China opposition political parties and the
public have made no impact. So the responsibility of supervising the
implementation of law falls on individual citizens. Only individual
citizens can take on their responsibility to supervise illegal conduct.
(B1120) 
In the past I was interested in political movements. (…) Right now I
am interested in religious freedom and freedom of speech. China will
not change at all if China does not grant religious freedom and freedom
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of speech. I never believed that lawyers would be a major force in pro-
ducing political reform in China. (…) We should not consider human
rights lawyers in China as our saviours. Chinese society is not a rational
society. The major force comes from ordinary citizens in China, and
that will compel civil society and democracy in China. (B1106)
Note that both lawyers emphasised the importance of working with or-
dinary citizens to supervise law enforcement and build up the capacity of
civil society. In their cases, some activist lawyers mobilised with petitioners,
Christian house churches, labour NGOs, and other sectors of civil society,
and that was a direct cause of the 709 Crackdown in July 2015 (Fu 2018). 
One reason that activist lawyers reached out to citizens was that state-
controlled bar associations in China were not supportive of lawyers’ collec-
tive action. Unlike common law jurisdictions in which bar autonomy and
judicial autonomy are inseparable elements of the rule of law (e.g., Hong
Kong, see next section), in China bar associations and the judiciary are two
independent lines of professional regulation or, more accurately, two insti-
tutional channels of Party-state containment. As one leading activist lawyer
puts it:
The Chinese government’s concept of bar associations is that bar as-
sociations are embedded inside the executive power. I call the whole
system Manchu-ism – a royal soldier [the justice bureau] and a fake
royal soldier [the bar association]. (B1401)
The role of bar associations and justice bureaus is often “to restrict and
oppress lawyers” (B1414). A human rights lawyer who was disbarred in 2009
discussed how this control worked in practice: 
When the government wants you to back up on a case, the justice
bureau will call the managing partner of the law firm and ask him to
kick you out. Either you leave, or you stay and will not be allowed to
do cases. If you leave and transfer your license, the justice bureau
will prevent the transfer. So you are left hanging. (B1419)
Another activist lawyer whose license was taken by the Beijing Bureau of
Justice despite his repeated demands for the justice bureau to hold a hearing
and return his license also commented:
Only when they return my license can I demonstrate to the public
that the justice bureau is a constitutional and legal institution. The
justice bureau should not trample on the Constitution. (B1523)
The use of the Constitution in this quote to criticise the abuse of power
in professional regulation is a striking example of how rule-of-law ideas are
mobilised by Chinese activist lawyers in their fight against the authoritarian
state. As another lawyer argued:
If there is a rule or regulation that is not consistent with a higher
law, we should break that law and ask for change that is consistent
with higher law. The highest law is China’s Constitution. (B1112)
In the Chinese context, however, the Constitution is not subject to judicial
review and thus cannot be applied directly in legal cases. Instead, the power
of the Party-state penetrates the judicial process.
All the way from the Supreme People’s Court to the local court, every
court is under the leadership of the Party and must be loyal to the
Party. So ultimately it is loyalty to a political leader. (B1306)
As a result:
All the good laws will be discounted in practice. But all the bad laws
will be well implemented. (B1307)
The fight for rule of law naturally becomes a fight against the authoritarian
state. Even the formalistic version of the rule of law requires government
officials to follow the law (Raz 1979). Chinese activist lawyers’ experiences
with the authoritarian state point to two contrasting aspects of instrumen-
tality of law in relation to power: (1) the authoritarian state uses law to fa-
cilitate arbitrary rule, that is, law serves power and its abuse by state
officials; and (2) lawyers use law to bring power in line and protect the vul-
nerability of citizens and themselves against state repression. The second
aspect is particularly intriguing, as lawyers use law as both a “weapon of
the weak” (i.e., to be used by marginalised lawyers) and a “weapon for the
weak” (i.e., to protect vulnerable citizens). In other words, law provides the
possibility to at least partially re-equilibrate the imbalance of power be-
tween the strong state and weak individual citizens. And it is lawyers’ task
to twist this equilibrium against the state and towards citizens. 
Yet Chinese activist lawyers differ in their views of how to achieve the
equilibrium. Some advocate for incremental change through individual cases
(B1103, B1114, B1132), whereas others call for more fundamental reform
of the political and legal systems (B1104, B1131). As one notable activist
lawyer commented:
My focus is not on defending the weakest. I believe that changing
the law is more important than individual cases. If the law is changed,
that will affect a large group of people. (B1104) 
Yet some lawyers do not see any conflict between the two approaches: 
Every case is a confrontation with the government. Each confronta-
tion with the government is a protection or defence of the legal sys-
tem or rule of law in China. Through individual cases again and again
we are trying to tell the government that without democracy, with-
out a new system, no one in your judicial system will execute the
law. We want to tell the government, if your own people do not obey
a law you have made, your party is headed toward a dead end.
(B1111)
Despite lawyers’ firm stance on the other side of authoritarianism, even
incremental changes in individual cases are difficult to achieve. In our con-
versations, Chinese activist lawyers frequently referred to the government
as a “police state” in which “the power of the police is unlimited” (B1317).
According to a lawyer who was detained and tortured by the police repeat-
edly, the police officer told him the following while detaining him: 
I am a police officer of the PRC and my job is to deal with people
like you. In this place, whether we abide by the law or not is our
choice. (…) We are more powerful than you. We can do anything, re-
gardless of the law. (B1320)
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Most importantly, the police “point the gun at the enemies of the state,
like Falun Gong, dissidents, or Christians” (B1323), all of whom are among
the clients of activist lawyers. 
Therefore, the law is also a weak weapon, a glorious yet powerless instru-
ment for Chinese lawyers to use in their fight against authoritarianism. Con-
sequently, many lawyers have resorted to the media, particularly the less
censored social media, to expose abuse of power by the police and other
state officials. For example, one lawyer mentioned that in most of his cases
he had a “media strategy” because “without the involvement of the media
it is impossible for the public to get to know the case and impossible for
the public to get to know the legal problems” (B1005). Another lawyer em-
phasised the educational function of publicising their legal opinions to the
media, as “the public will know how international standards apply, how
other countries deal with similar cases” (B1104). However, with increased
control and censorship over social media since the mid-2010s (Lei 2018),
the effectiveness of such media strategies has also decreased, leaving ac-
tivist lawyers limited options for making their voices heard by the Chinese
public. 
In short, for activist lawyers in Beijing, the rule of law is both an ideal and
a weapon in their persistent fight against authoritarianism and for a more
liberal-legal political society. Both procedural and substantive aspects of
the rule of law are frequently invoked in their discourses, yet they are
bounded by the structural constraints of both a highly repressive state and
a nascent and oppressed civil society. As a result, rule of law becomes a
shiny but blunt sword with more symbolic than substantive power. It is
often ineffective in helping lawyers win legal battles in court, but by firmly
sticking to it, activist lawyers can at least legitimise their words and actions
before the state, the public, and the international community. Through rule
of law they keep alive the consciousness and hope of a future political-legal
order in a new China. 
Rule of law as a solid shield: Pro-democracy
lawyers in Hong Kong
In Hong Kong, the rule of law is also a weapon for lawyers to resist au-
thoritarianism. However, while the mainland activist lawyers attempt to
use rule of law to shift the power relations between the state and citizens,
politically liberal lawyers in Hong Kong expect rule of law to shield the ju-
risdiction from authoritarian rule, as a defensive mechanism for preserving
the current legal system and maintaining the power equilibrium in local
politics. Often labelling themselves “pro-democracy lawyers” or “pan-
democracy lawyers,” these lawyers embrace not only universal suffrage but
also civil society and judicial independence. Judicial autonomy is the core
element of rule-of-law discourse for Hong Kong lawyers, which is con-
structed from three aspects: (1) organic legal doctrines embedded in the
common law system; (2) an independent and professional judiciary; and (3)
a united bar of integrity. All three aspects are frequently referred to in the
context of resisting Beijing’s external influence.
A British colony for more than a century before its handover to the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China in 1997, Hong Kong has a common law system that
was mostly kept intact when it returned to China. Maintaining the organic
legal doctrines and the linkage to the common law world is a key insurance
to keep the institutional design of “one country, two systems” – a political
promise made by Beijing to delimit its own power in Hong Kong. This
promise was clearly prescribed in Article 8 of the Basic Law of the Hong
Kong SAR: “The laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common
law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law
shall be maintained.”
Some Hong Kong lawyers refer to this legal continuity as a guarantee that
Hong Kong would not fall to the authoritarian practices in the mainland
(HKS1705), or that China would restrain itself from changing the status
quo. For instance, the former chair of the Hong Kong Bar Association, Paul
Shieh, demonstrated this point with his own life story. When he was about
to begin his legal study at the University of Cambridge in 1983, he applied
to transfer to natural science for the reason that Hong Kong’s future was
undecided. The school administration accepted his application, but he with-
drew the transfer “based on one word, belief. I believed that [the mainland]
would not greatly change Hong Kong but keep Hong Kong; you’re not going
to screw Hong Kong, not go backwards. So I chose to study law” (Lin 2017).
Maintaining common law institutions is not only consistent with the po-
litical promises made by Beijing but also an organic operation that lawyers
perform to sustain the power of the citizenry vis-à-vis the government. In
September 2014, Hong Kong witnessed the Umbrella Movement, an un-
precedented 81-day street demonstration in which more than a million res-
idents participated to demand universal suffrage. Confrontation erupted
between the police and protesters, resulting in many court cases concerned
with the freedoms of speech and assembly. Hong Kong barristers mobilised
to represent the Umbrella protesters (Lee 2017b). After losing one case of
civil disobedience, a barrister who represented several defendants never-
theless expressed his unyielding confidence in Hong Kong’s rule of law, “be-
cause we are connected to the common law. I might lose this time, but I’ll
use another argument next time, and I might win” (HKB1701). The organic
and consistent embeddedness of Hong Kong jurisprudence in the common
law world, in his opinion, provides lawyers like him with legal instruments
and a fair chance to practice civic rights and check government power in
court.
Judicial autonomy is the second aspect that reoccurs in comments by pro-
democracy lawyers on the rule of law in Hong Kong. Theoretically, an inde-
pendent and professional judiciary is a key institutional requirement of rule
of law as well as an inherent element of political liberalism (Halliday and
Karpik 1997; Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008). Empirically, the Hong Kong
bench, which has maintained consistent competency and impartiality for
generations, is often referred to as an instrument that resists the one-sided
legal-political agenda pursued by the Hong Kong SAR government and Bei-
jing. A politically active barrister who self-identified as a progressive ex-
plained the trusted role of the Hong Kong judiciary:
When you have an executive who is not accountable to the mass
public and a legislature, at least most of them are not directly ac-
countable to the people, and you have a judiciary, you can have more
trust that they are not for the government. People see some cases
ruling against the government, that the government doesn’t always
get its way; whereas in the legislature, the government almost always
gets its way, and of course the executive is a government. So that’s
where the lawyers’ trust [of the judiciary] comes from. The trust is
relative. (HKB1702)
The perceived role of the judiciary, or expectations of politically liberal
lawyers like him, is arguably a reason why many lawyers in Hong Kong have
reacted strongly when Hong Kong government officials appear to under-
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mine the court. Since 1997, Hong Kong lawyers have initiated at least four
public demonstrations, styled “dress in black, march in silence,” to defend
judicial independence (Tam 2013; Lee 2017b). Three out of the four demon-
strations, respectively in 1999, 2005, and 2016, were in direct response to
interpretations of the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress (NPCSC) in Beijing, while one protest in 2014 was a re-
action against the statement in the White Paper issued by the PRC State
Council that judges, being part of the Hong Kong government, should be
patriotic. An expatriate solicitor and former partner at a major American
law firm shared his observation:
Rule of law to Hong Kong lawyers is judicial independence, as in they
disapprove that judges should “love the country,” and separation of
powers, so when Zhang Xiaoming [the Director of the Liaison Office of
the Central People’s Government in Hong Kong] said the CE [the Chief
Executive] overrides three organs and that separation of powers is not
for Hong Kong, that’s what people have taken issue with. (HKS1706)
Another solicitor, a self-identified “liberal,” indicated a similar view, sup-
porting local judicial autonomy and opposing Beijing undercutting the
court. Her comments concern the disqualification controversies in 2016. In
October 2016, a number of pro-democracy members-elect of the Hong
Kong Legislative Council (LegCo) held props or said slogans to protest
against Beijing during their oath-taking ceremonies. The Hong Kong gov-
ernment soon filed an application for judicial review to disqualify the mem-
bers-elect on the allegation that they did not take the oath solemnly. The
Chief Executive also stated that an interpretation from Beijing may be nec-
essary. While the case was under appeal in the Hong Kong judiciary, Beijing
reacted before the court reached a final decision. The NPCSC issued an in-
terpretation of the Basic Law in November 2016, essentially forbidding
members-elect from expressing political views when they take the oath.
This solicitor strongly disapproved of the actions taken by both govern-
ments and the political message behind them: 
What lawyers care the most [for] is, (...) autonomy, don’t let other
people decide your own business. For example, the Hong Kong Chief
Executive shouldn’t ask Beijing to interpret the Basic Law. (...) Another
example that really worries me is the 2016 LegCo election, the pro-
cess in which some members are unseated. CE [The Chief Executive]
filed the application to the judiciary, and before the court reached a
decision, the NPCSC intervened. What annoys me the most is, why
the CE [Chief Executive] brought this up to Beijing?! It’s obviously
something we can deal with. (HKS1704)
It should be noted, however, that a counter-argument is also present
among Hong Kong lawyers. Precisely on this incident of Basic Law interpre-
tation, another solicitor perceived otherwise: 
The Basic Law is the bridge connecting the Hong Kong common law
and Chinese continental law. You can’t say Hong Kong has no rule of
law because the NPCSC issues an interpretation. (HKS1707)
While this solicitor ignored the political agenda indicated in the NPCSC
interpretation, Lawrence Ma, a barrister who publicly identified himself with
“love for country, love for Hong Kong” (Primrose 2018), took a strict proce-
dural standpoint to defend the interpretation’s conformity to rule of law:
“Although the NPCSC might have certain political aims in mind to be
achieved, nonetheless, there was never any arbitrary exercise of power that
infringed the spirit of the rule of law principle” (Lee et al. 2017).
Essentially the two voices differ on the question of whom the law serves.
For some, law affords a neutral and procedural channel through which ex-
ternal political power can and is entitled to exert influence on Hong Kong
by circumventing the local judiciary. As long as political influence meets
the minimum procedural requirement, the rule of law remains. In other
words, power can delimit judicial autonomy without undermining rule of
law, as long as the law stipulates a way to do so. It is precisely this line of
argument that puts the Hong Kong legal profession at odds with more rad-
ical pro-democracy activists, some of whom criticise the constrained posi-
tion of lawyers on the NPCSC interpretation and other contentious issues. 
The third theme that emerged in interviews with Hong Kong lawyers, es-
pecially barristers, is the emphasis they place on a bar that preserves its in-
dependence and integrity (Lee 2017a). A large number of judges were
practicing barristers before being elevated to the bench in Hong Kong, as in
many other common law jurisdictions. Accordingly, a strong sense of pro-
fessional fraternity is discernible in some barristers’ defence of judicial au-
tonomy. As a barrister-politician explained:
First, it’s a feeling, they’re one of us. One day I [a barrister] might sit
on that bench too. Second, in the Hong Kong legal profession, or any
common law legal profession, many were master and pupil before.
It’s personal. If you trace the professional ancestry, that judge has a
relationship with me. (HKB1703)
The rhetoric of a united bar legitimises pro-democracy lawyers’ support
of the judiciary as a viable channel to resist authoritarian rule, if not the
only viable channel left available in Hong Kong. Commenting on the oath-
taking controversies mentioned above, the barrister-politician defended the
judiciary’s decision following the NPCSC interpretation, which disqualified
all six members-elect:
Everyone knows he [the judge] has his difficulties. Everyone is in the
same boat. Facing the same authority, the same authoritarian regime.
(…) if I attack him [the judge], he’s left all alone. And the rule of law
is the root of Hong Kong; the judiciary is one of the most important
ingredients protecting the rule of law. (HKB1703)
It is evident from the quote that this barrister considered it a collective
task for the bar, lawyers and judges alike, to shield the jurisdiction from au-
thoritarian rule. A united legal profession serves this role via mutual support
where the judiciary make judgments and lawyers produce public discourses
to sustain the judiciary’s legitimacy in the name of rule of law. Needless to
say, there are many variations in attitudes towards Hong Kong’s democratic
movements vis-à-vis Beijing’s influence among barristers and solicitors, yet
the support of the judiciary and the common law system is mostly con-
sensual across the bar and the solicitors’ branches. Lawyers’ insistence on
defending the judiciary sometimes puts them at odds with other activists
in civil society who are more critical towards the judiciary, especially when
the court makes seemingly pro-Beijing decisions. 
In sum, the rule of law is a solid but increasingly dented shield for pro-
democracy lawyers to preserve the legal system and the way of life in Hong
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Kong from the encroachment of authoritarian rule across the border. Indeed,
for many Hong Kong lawyers, the rule of law is “a bordering practice”
(HKS1706) to prevent retrogression to political arbitrariness. Judicial au-
tonomy is the core element that centres many lawyers’ discussions with
three specific focuses on jurisprudence, the judiciary, and the bar, all of
which are perceived to be instrumental in resistance to authoritarianism.
Conclusion
In terms of professional and social backgrounds, the two groups of lawyers
in Beijing and Hong Kong on whom we have focused our discussion could
not be more different. Most activist lawyers in Beijing came from humble
social origins, did not have an elite legal education, and often migrated from
the provinces to the capital (Liu, Liang, and Michelson 2014), whereas bar-
risters and solicitors in Hong Kong are among the most globalised, cos-
mopolitan elite professionals in the world (Lee 2017a). Nevertheless, some
of their views on the rule of law and its relationship to authoritarianism and
political liberalism appear strikingly similar. Both groups emphasise the pro-
cedural aspect of rule of law, particularly the importance of judicial inde-
pendence and legal proceduralism in resisting arbitrary state power.
Furthermore, the rule of law is often “weaponised” as either a sword for po-
litical reform (for Beijing lawyers) or a shield against authoritarian attack
(for Hong Kong lawyers). Echoing a recent study of how the Chinese state
weaponises rule of law using official propaganda (Trevaskes 2017), our anal-
ysis in this article has shown that the instrumental use of rule-of-law dis-
course is also widespread among opponents of the state. 
The comparison between Beijing and Hong Kong suggests that the fight
for rule of law is highly sensitive to its local context. For activist lawyers
in Beijing, the pursuit of judicial independence is nothing but a distant
dream involving a restructuring of the state under China’s current polit-
ical regime, and they therefore focus their mobilisation for rule of law
around basic legal freedoms (e.g., freedom of speech and freedom of re-
ligion) and the growth of a nascent civil society. By contrast, Hong Kong
lawyers hold the autonomy of their judiciary as a paramount value
mainly because it is a powerful defensive weapon against Beijing’s polit-
ical influence. In other words, the rule of law as a shield is only effective
where its institutional and normative foundations are solid (as in Hong
Kong), and it becomes little more than a blunt sword for lawyers where
such foundations are weak or missing (as in mainland China). Notably,
in the Xi Jinping era, the sword of law remains blunt, and the shield of
law is increasingly under attack. 
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